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Bernard Lonergan and John Finnis
on the Question of Values
PROFESSOR MICHAEL AMBROSIO

Introduction
Throughout my more than four decades as a law professor, during which
I taught courses in Jurisprudence including a Law and Morality Seminar, I have
read and reread some of the masterpieces of legal, moral and political
philosophy including the contemporary works of Bernard Lonergan and John
Finnis.

Although it is relatively easy to understand the views of particular

philosophers, attempting to reconcile different philosophical views is far more
challenging. Although Lonergan and Finnis approach the subject of ethics or
morality from different perspectives and have a different conception of values, it
always seemed to me that they their views were essentially compatible.
More than thirty-five years ago I spent the better part of two years
digesting Bernard Lonergan’s two celebrated works, Insight and Method in
Theology. I was struck by his detailed description of the process of thought that
leads to insight or truth and how the journey inward in a voyage of selfdiscovery produces knowledge and understanding of true values and what it
means to be a morally responsible person. When I first encountered John Finnis’
Natural Law and Natural Rights, a contemporary restatement of the AristotelianThomistic classical natural law theory, I was similarly impressed with Finnis’
bottom up approach to natural law. Father Brian Cronin’s Faculty Seminar on
Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective provided an opportunity for me to revisit
whether Lonergan’s view of morality and its emphasis on the valuing subject is
compatible with John Finnis’ natural law theory, with its emphasis on selfevident fundamental and absolute values and self-evident principles of practical
reason, that he refers to modes of responsibility and the deep structure of moral
thought.
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Lonergan and Finnis Have Different Approaches to the Question of Values
Lonergan’s thought reflects the epistemology of existentialism and
phenomenology and the subjectivism of the modern and postmodern eras.
Rather than present a theory of morality, Cronin draws on Lonergan’s
methodology to construct a values ethic based on self-appropriation of conscious
activities in response to feelings. Exploring the process of thinking and gaining
insight, Lonergan describes in great detail a method of achieving an
understanding of how the desire to know the truth leads to judgments of true
value.
Father Cronin points out the ambiguity of the term values and notes that it
is a term that was equated with good until about 200 years ago. His use of the
term is meant to focus on the subjective source and creation of values. Lonergan
describes a scale of values that he considers hierarchical. He sets forth five
distinct kinds of values in an ascending order of importance including vital
values, social values, cultural values, moral values and religious values.

He

posits that different levels of consciousness ground the distinction between the
five different kinds of values. For Lonergan, the goal is to determine the good to
be realized at each level. He divides values according to the level at which they
are intended. He talks about vital values at the level of experience, social values
at the level of understanding, cultural values at the level of judgment, personal
values at the level of deliberation and religious values at a fifth level.
Lonergan’s position on the question of value appears at odds with Finnis’
exhaustive theory of the good, in which Finnis identifies seven basic,
fundamental, universal and absolute values or goods including life, knowledge,
friendship, play, beauty, religion and practical reason. Finnis uses the term value
interchangeably with good, but for ease of understanding he uses the word value
to refer to good in a general sense and the word good to refer to particular goods.
Finnis has an exhaustive theory of the good.
irreducible categories.

The seven basic goods are

All of them are equally important and equally
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fundamental and non-commensurable.

They are all obvious and self-evident

and, although they form the substrata of morality, they are not in themselves
moral norms.

Like Aquinas, Finnis contends that understanding of human

goods or values is the product of self-reflection and not derived logically from
first principles. Unlike Cronin and Lonergan, Finnis follows Aquinas’ view that
values are synonymous with goods and sees the basic values or goods as final or
absolute ends for human beings. For Finnis, absolute or universal values are the
point of human action. They are achieved through the exercise of principles of
practical reason, the objective principles of morality. Finnis’ theory of the good
has the virtue of being simple and straightforward and consistent with human
experience. Finnis points out that those who reject the self-evident goods are
self-refuting in that they inevitably act in pursuit of those goods.

He refers to

the studies of primitive societies by cultural anthropologists who despite their
efforts to establish the absence of universal values in fact confirmed their
existence.
Whereas Lonergan and Cronin refer to terminal and originating values
and consider moral values as specifically distinct from other values or not to be
put at the same level of other values, Finnis considers instantiation of values or
the good, through the application of practical reason, as the product of morality.
He distinguishes between absolute values or goods, valued for their own sake,
and instrumental values or goods, goods that are a means of achieving some
other good. Finnis also distinguishes between conditions necessary for pursuit
of values and values. Thus, for example, one needs a brain and material
conditions, such as food and air, to experience the basic good of life. Finnis
considers the seven basic or fundamental values of life, knowledge, friendship,
play, beauty, religion and practical reason as universal because every human
being must participate in them if they are to fully flourish.
Lonergan and Finnis on Methodology
Lonergan describes a four-fold process of critical thinking aimed at
achieving the good as follows: first, be observant, pay attention, get the facts;
second, be inquisitive, ask questions; third, be reasonable, deliberate, evaluate,
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judge; and fourth, be responsible, take action. This process is not unlike Finnis’
methodological requirements of practical reasonableness in which he applies
nine principles of practical reason, or what he calls modes of responsibility, to
decide what actions ought or ought not be done. Both Lonergan and Finnis,
albeit in different ways, provide a framework for morally responsible actions for
anyone with inner integrity and outer authenticity.
Lonergan follows Aquinas in ordering values in accord with their
importance. Aquinas arranged the basic forms of good and the self-evident
primary principles of practical reasoning, which he calls the first principles and
primary precepts of natural law in a three-fold order: (1) life is to be sustained
and what threatens it is to be prevented; (2) coupling of a man and a woman and
the education of their young are to be favored and what opposes it is to be
avoided; (3) knowledge (especially the truth about God), social life, and practical
reasonableness are goods, and ignorance, offense to others and practical
unreasonableness are to be avoided. Finnis rejects Aquinas’ three-fold order as
irrelevant to ethical reflection.

He writes: “As it happens, Aquinas’ three-fold

order quite properly plays no part in his practical (ethical) elaboration of the
significance and consequences of the primary precepts of natural law; for
example, the first order good of life may not, in his view, be deliberately attached
to preserve the third order good of friendship with God.“ Finnis does not inject
metaphysical considerations into the reconstruction of practical discourse and
insists that the basic values, being primary, indemonstrable and self-evident, are
not derivable (nor sought by Aquinas to be derived) from any speculative
considerations.
Like Lonergan, Finnis posits that the human good or goods can be
discovered through a process of critical self-reflection.

But, unlike Lonergan,

Finnis considers pursuit of the good in terms of practical principle. For Finnis,
morality is the product of deliberating and deciding on the means to pursue the
good. (Life is to be pursued and promoted, knowledge is to be pursued and
promoted, etc. are practical rather than moral principles.)

Morality is the

product of applying the principles of practical reason in the instantiation of the
basic values.

Lonergan’s hierarchical ordering of values and his distinction
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between different kinds and levels of values is more nuanced, and as such, more
difficult to understand than Finnis’ straightforward definition of absolute values
or goods. Despite the complexity of his definitions of different kinds of values,
Lonergan’s description of vital values generally incorporates what Finnis’ refers
to as the good of life. His description of social values incorporates what Finnis
refers to as the goods of friendship and play. His description of cultural values
incorporates what Finnis refers to as the good of knowledge of truth and
practical reason.

And his description of religious values incorporates what

Finnis refers to as the good of religion.
Lonergan and Finnis Differ on the Role of Feelings in Moral Judgment
Perhaps the most significant difference between the approach to morality
of Finnis and Lonergan lies in the role of feelings in making moral judgments.
While Finnis essentially ignores the role of feelings, Lonergan considers feelings
as a central element of ethical thinking. Father Cronin points out the distinction
between a theory of morality and a description of the process of understanding
of moral truth on the basis self-appropriation of conscious judgments of fact and
values. While recognizing the value of theory to explain and justify actions, he is
skeptical of the process of applying principles and rules to concrete cases. His
value ethics is based on the human capacity to understand the experience of
consciousness and to self-appropriate that experience, including one’s feelings, in
making moral decisions. Finnis’ theory of morality is in accord with the tradition
of natural law philosophy that goes no farther than recognizing Aristotle’s
observation that feelings can be habituated so that one can acquire the habit of
feeling good about being good.

Finnis’ restatement of classical natural law

theory looks solely to human reason as the ground for morality. Finnis says
morally responsible choices can be made enthusiastically or dryly with little or
no feeling. Lonergan’s insights about the role of feeling in moral understanding
and judgment, however, are not incompatible with Finnis’ natural law theory.
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The Bottom Up Approach to Morality
What Finnis and Lonergan agree on is far more important than what they
differ about. Although Finnis and Lonergan explore the question of value from
very different perspectives and with starkly different approaches, they both
adopt a bottom up approach to morality that is consistent with the top down
approach of religion. Lonergan relies on the subjective understanding of one’s
thinking process and Finnis begins with an objective set of values that he
contends are obvious and self-evident as the sub-strata of moral reasoning.
Whereas Finnis points to the studies of cultural anthropologists, like Margaret
Mead and Ruth Benedict, for evidence of the existence of universal values,
Lonergan points to the reality of human experience through an exhaustive
examination of human interiority.

Both Finnis and Lonergan assert that

knowledge of the good is underived and self-evident.

Lonergan posits the

existence of a scale of human values can be affirmed and self-appropriated
through an examination of one’s own subjective understanding. Following
Aquinas, Finnis points to the human capacity for reason to grasp as obvious and
self-evident the existence of fundamental and universal values.

Although

Lonergan’s method focuses on the subjective process of choosing values and puts
values in a hierarchical order, Finnis does not rule out the subjective element in
the choice of values and their hierarchy. He posits that every individual can
establish their own hierarchy of values so long as they pursue them in accord
with the demands of practical reason and the reasonable scope for self-preference
that is not to be confused with biased self-interest, selfishness or egoism.
Despite their different approaches in dealing with the question of value
and moral decision-making, Finnis and Lonergan agree on a number of
fundamental points. First, that human beings have the capacity to know good
and evil and right and wrong.

Second, that knowledge of the good is the

product of self-reflection and experience. This is central to Lonergan’s view of
values as discoverable through a process of examining one’s interiority or
consciousness leading ultimately to a self-appropriation of values. Finnis asserts
basic or universal goods or values are objective, because they are obvious and
self-evident to anyone who reflects on their human nature and human
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experience. Third, the good is prior to the right—judgments of value precede
moral judgments. Fourth, the good is always concrete. Fifth, morality entails the
promotion and achievement of the good in one’s life and the lives of others.

Conclusion
Both Lonergan and Finnis arrive at the same conclusion as Aristotle and
Aquinas and other natural law theorists that good and evil are knowable and can
be discovered through unaided reason. Father Cronin’s Value Ethics: A Lonergan
Perspective based on Bernard Lonergan’s critical realism and John Finnis’
contemporary restatement of classical natural law theory, albeit in different
ways, provide an in-depth treatment of the question of values.

They both

provide a sound framework for moral analysis in a bottom up approach that
begins with knowledge and understanding of the good as the foundation for
moral judgments.

Because they provide a path to self-knowledge and self-

transcendence and point to the ultimate connection between discovered truth
and revealed truth, they should have a prominent place in the curriculum of
Catholic universities.
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Building Value Ethics Beyond the Book,
The Importance of Shared Research

ALAN DELOZIER

When contemplating the depth of meaning behind the core concept of
value ethics, this inspires me to ponder the wider acceptance of such a divine
force and how it impacts myself and others. Living in such a high paced and
materialistic society that may not always take the time for deeper thought makes
me wonder how often the words of philosophers such as Bernard Lonergan
resonate in the wider world. Hope is alive, but using our head along with the
heart to build an individual value system often relies at least in part on formal
learning in order to disseminate how ideals are ultimately shaped. Having no
previous grounding in Lonerganian thought, this seminar proved illuminating as
it raised points that helped to broaden my look at how value ethics have been
viewed from an original mind and preserved beyond his time for discovery by
the wider world as well.
For example, the privilege of learning about the “Human Person” model
from Father Brian Cronin has led to a new look at how an individual becomes
more substantively developed. In particular, the focus upon “responsibility” and
“intelligence” spoke to me most clearly when it comes to absorbing and
ultimately adopting the deeper spirit of moral and social values. The desired
result of finding value judgment and expression comes out of looking at the final
stages associated with these powerful traits. The following phrase from the pen
of Father Cronin personally captures the essence of being able to acquire a
deeper meaning with true appreciation. “To ‘appropriate’ is to make one’s own,
to take possession of one-self, to be in control of oneself…. It is to become aware
of ourselves as moral subjects, to recognize the feelings, inclinations, ambitions,
motives, prejudices and biases operating in the field of moral judgments,
decisions and actions…. Moral philosophy often emphasizes information,
memory work, historical knowledge…comparing theories, expanding familiarity
11

with sources in scholarship…”1

These words tie directly into my professional

outlook as the principles of building a higher self-awareness through
memorialization, carrying on tradition, and specialized research that can bring
one to an ideal place in their own spiritual life.
The facilitation of providing information without imparting our own
personal moral judgment is always foremost in presenting the Lonergan model
and other viewpoints to a wider audience. An unadulterated work is in turn
imparted to our research community.

From this basis, it becomes the

responsibility of the individual in question to determine their own value
judgments based on the research that most deeply resonates within themselves.
The benefit of this experience allowed for an invaluable educational
odyssey that continues forward. In finding the answers to questions that arise
helps an individual to grow in turn. Therefore, when we are curious this helps
develop the intellect and greatly benefits the whole person overall. The quest for
personal truth marches onward and is part of the human experience that makes
for a more aware and ethically responsible world in the process.

Works Cited
Cronin, Brian. Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective. Nairobi: Consolata Institute
of Philosophy, 2006.

Brian Cronin, Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective (Nairobi: Consolata Institute of Philosophy,
2006), 108.
1
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On the Communal Dimension of Value Ethics

ANTHONY L. HAYNOR

As I was listening and attempting to digest more fully Fr. Brian Cronin’s
engaging and illuminating discourses on value ethics from a Lonerganian
perspective, my thoughts returned again and again to the same question: “But,
are not value ethics at their core a ‘communal’ phenomenon?”
My sociological training has sensitized me to three lines of inquiry that
bear on the communal nature of morality and ethics. The first, associated with
Emile Durkheim,1 (and more recently, Talcott Parsons2) frames the moral/ethical
domain as enabling humans to transcend the limitations of our impulses and the
immediacy of our desires, to tap into something larger than ourselves (referred
to by Durkheim as “homo duplex”). “Values,” according to Parsons, as
“conceptions of the desirable” become “institutionalized” in social systems and
“internalized” in personality systems. Values become constitutive of the roles
we play in various collectivities (our social system involvements) and of our
“need-dispositions” (at the level of personality).

So, for example, the value of

“health” becomes institutionalized in fitness clubs and nutrition stores (and in
the roles attendant to them) and internalized to the degree that personalities
possess the need-disposition to be healthy. While this general perspective has
been criticized for portraying “an oversocialized conception of man” 3 (which
Parsons rejected given the “tensions” that he acknowledged as existing among
the cultural, social, and personality systems), it advances the necessary point that
values are communally shared and shape in definite ways the meanings that
individuals assign to their behavior, as mediated by role expectations.
The second line of inquiry emerges out of the phenomenological tradition,
represented by Alfred Schutz,4 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann.5 Their
argument essentially is that that the human desire for order manifests itself in the
“externalization” of an “inter-subjective” reality that becomes “objectivated”
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(that is, takes an institutionalized form) and “internalized” (that is, takes the
form of an appropriated “subjective” reality). These processes make it possible
for social actors to navigate their way through the normal business of everyday
life (by relying on “recipe” knowledge).
The third line of inquiry is pragmatist in tone, represented best by the
seminal contributions of George H. Mead.6 In this view, morals and ethics are
“negotiated” by actors whose respective definitions of the situation become
aligned to each other as part of an evolutionary process in which “significant
symbols” that guide collective action are constructed. In this process, the “Me”
(the self that reflects the expectations of others) and the “I” (the assertive or
willful aspect of the self) are harmonized through the ongoing dialectical
interplay of the two realities. Mead’s insights were later extended by Jurgen
Habermas7 in his “discourse ethics.”
A few connections to the Lonerganian perspective on value ethics
explicated by Fr. Cronin can be drawn. The Durkheimian-Parsonian line of
inquiry, one can argue, relates to Lonergan’s concept of “group bias,” 8 given the
fact that our values are relative to the normative demands of our roles which are
largely situational.

In addition, our need-dispositions are shaped by group

values and the specific ways in which they are institutionalized. The
phenomenological perspective speaks directly to what Lonergan regards as
“common-sense”9 knowledge (a term used by Schutz, Berger and Luckmann,
who drew on Husserl’s notion of the “natural attitude”). Finally, the MeadianHabermasian perspective relates to Lonergan’s discussion of inter-subjective
reality and how it is forged within particular communities (e.g. the scientific
community).10
In conclusion, the communal dimension of Lonergan’s value ethics, I
would argue, has been understated. There is an identifiable communal strand in
Lonergan’s thought, one that in critical respects parallels and intersects with the
three lines of sociological inquiry sketched above. I do agree, however,
wholeheartedly with Fr. Cronin on one crucial point. Sociology (Fr. Cronin’s
undergraduate major area of study) has tended, regrettably, to abdicate any
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meaningful role in the formulation of a “reasonable” value ethical position with
action implications, either because of its misplaced obsession with valueneutrality, its commitment to value relativism, or its belief that values are a
matter of existential choice, extra-scientific in their fundamental character.11 But,
there are sociological models on which to build. One is the discourse ethics of
Mead-Habermas. Another is the social ethics put forward by the sociologist,
Harry C. Bredemeier.12 The degree to which and the sense in which they are
compatible with the Generalized Empirical Method of Lonergan are questions
that merit systematic examination.
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Understanding Values in Health Care
PATRICIA M. HUBERT

The impetus for my attendance at the “Understanding Values” seminar
was my exposure to the work of Bernard Lonergan at the meeting on Religion
and Health Care organized by Msgr. Richard Liddy in the Spring of 2013. I
listened, and thought, perhaps more deeply than I had in quite some time. It was
clear that I needed to learn more about this way of thinking, and of being. In fact,
it influenced me to be open to possibilities without knowing the outcome. This
began a period of discernment for me that has been on-going. It has led to my
taking a leap, re: something I had considered for a long time. I decided to pursue
formal study and began the application process for the doctoral program in
nursing practice. When I noticed Msgr. Liddy was having meetings to prepare
for Fr. Brian Cronin’s summer seminar I knew I had to attend. Cronin’s book,
Value Ethics: a Lonergan Perspective chronicles the journey I believe is necessary to
take in order to better understand and clarify my thinking and my judgments.
So I tackled the book. The preparatory outlines from Msgr. Liddy helped me
understand the concepts, and the contributions of several faculty members to our
discussions led to a richness that is difficult to explain—one had to be there to
appreciate the decision involved in stopping for a red light!

[The personal

appearance and suggestions of Fr. Cronin combined with the opportunity to hear
from distinguished colleagues in various disciplines was very meaningful to me].
Deciding right from wrong is not so simple. (What guides us? Natural
law, moral law, feeling, reason?) As Cronin asks, “What is this extraordinary
ability we have to know good from evil; to evaluate people, actions, policies and
things, from the point of view of good, better, best or bad, worse or worst?”1
As a nurse, I am used to the scientific method, and facts. I had to refocus
my attention on more esoteric matters and try to be contemplative. I struggled to
see the nuances in some of the words, and admittedly, found myself in
Wikipedia more than a few times. For me, the presence of intentionality in
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Lonergan’s concept of self-appropriation2 is significant. And Lonergan’s levels of
consciousness makes sense: moving from a level of experiencing to
understanding to judgment, then valuing, and finally religious orientation. I can
also embrace the transcendental imperatives he outlines for us: to be attentive,
be intelligent, be responsible and be in love. These are imperatives I can live
with.

What is the point of good decision making?

In my profession it is

essential. The nurse must use all senses to experience, understand and make
sound judgments using critical thinking skills. Further, the profession has its
own Code of Ethics to guide judgment, decisions and actions. Presently I am
studying all that is involved in nursing research and have learned that in 1985
the American Nurses Association published six ethical guidelines for nurses for
protecting the rights of human subjects in research. The issue of ethics is
foundational in nursing. In the final analysis it is each nurse who must decide
what is the right course of action in any given situation. I appreciate having had
the opportunity to clarify my own thinking before embarking on my first
doctoral course.

And, coincidentally, it prepared me for my first written

assignment: My Philosophy of the DNP. And for my larger assignment: life.
Thank you.

Works Cited
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Values Originate from an Absolute Truth

JOSE L. LOPEZ

All civilizations function on the premise that there are certain value
systems that are to be respected and followed by all members of the society.
These values are the fundamental basis by which these groups of people abide
each day and live their entire lives. Fundamentally, values gauge the amount of
importance that the group places on certain matters. Further, the value system
determines and informs the appropriate action or method to best do something.
Values deal with right conduct and effectively living a good life. In this sense a
highly valuable action may be regarded as ethically "good," and an action of low
value may be regarded as "bad".
What makes an action valuable may in turn depend on the ethical value of
the standard it increases, decreases, or even alters. An object with "ethic value"
may be termed an "ethic or philosophic good". All human societies have for a
long time worked to determine, refine, and adapt the certain value ethics that the
group follows. The acceptance of these values promise the individual citizen that
adapts them a certain degree of “happiness”. If the individual attains a certain
societally prescribed degree of happiness, then the larger group of the
civilization is stable and prosperous. However, the degree of the individually
attainable happiness is determined by the level of common good it would have.
If the personal happiness disregards or threatens the safety, stability, or
prosperity of the greater society then those actions are shunned by the entire
group.
For these reasons, personal value is an absolute or relative standard that in
some cases might agree with the greater societal value system or in some
circumstances might completely conflict with the societal norm. This is not to say
that all societally accepted values are correct or moral. A brief regression through
history demonstrates various examples of former value systems that were found
to be bad or even evil. The clearest example in history has been slavery where the
19

individualistic happiness of one person completely suppresses the happiness of
another person. Slavery, like other forms of mass scale human cruelty such as
genocide, terrorism, or unjustified imprisonment, has been identified as
unethical, immoral, and cruel. The determination of the unacceptability of these
historically bad actions came first from the determination by individuals that
realized the inappropriateness of these socially accepted values. Once these
actions were determined improper, the greater group went about changing the
existing value system.
In essence, the actions of determining the appropriateness of certain
actions in the value system is determined by a self-realization of what
detrimental impact the actions have, not only to the individual, but also to the
entire civilization. This process of determining the appropriate values through
personal realization has been identified by various thinkers throughout human
history. One can think of Aristotle’s system of virtues and vices. Or Aquinas’s
distinctions of eternal law, natural law, and human law that help in the
determination of values. The more contemporary thinker about the development
of a value system is Bernard Lonergan, S.J., the 20th century Jesuit philosopher,
theologian, and teacher.
Lonergan’s approach to the development of values stems from a method
he terms “self-appropriation”. It is only when the individual consciously follows
Lonergan’s General Empirical Method in which the person first experiences the
actions, understands the effects of the actions, makes judgments on the
appropriateness of the actions followed by a final decision of the good or evil of
the action that a value is born. Lonergan identifies once the individual has
reached a value that there exist five basic types of values. Vital values come from
the mere fact of a person being alive as being a fundamentally good thing. In
other words, there is a value to life and being healthy. The second, social values,
originate from having a safe structure for civilization which encourages
cooperation. The third, cultural values, are handed down and accepted as
important to the preservation of the culture’s identity. The fourth value type is
moral values that identifies a necessity for mutual respect and obligation of each
person to each other. Then the fifth value category is religious values that arise
from core beliefs and faith.
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In essence, I would summarize that there really are only two types of
fundamental values. These two fundamental value types are group and personal
values. Group values encompass Lonergan’s social, cultural, and religious
values. Personal values encompasses vital and moral values. Vital values come
from the biological necessity of personal self-perseverance and survival. A vital
necessity for all individual humans is water and food. Due to these absolute
requirements to live, this personal value is the foundation of all values. Once an
individual is able to live adequately, then the next key personal value type
would be moral values. The person realizes that the allowance for life not only
applies to them, but also should apply to other individuals as well. Effectively, a
respect for life arises that causes a self-realization that all life is worthy of respect
and important. Once the personal values are in place then the group values of
social, cultural, and religious values become important.
By no means is there a linearity of progression of values originating as
personal values and then progressing onward to group values. These
fundamental values co-exist in a cyclical relationship. No individual has come
into existence purely by themselves. All people are born from other people. The
group values inform the necessity to continue life onward and at first impose the
group value system onto the newborn individual. The newborn due to his
fundamental nature seeks to live and survive and will immediately commence to
develop a personal value system. The newborn will struggle realizing it
individually wants to live. The baby will realize that its existence is enhanced
through respect and obligation to other people. This new formation of a personal
value system all happened in stereo with a pre-existing group value system
playing a symbiotic role.
As discussed earlier, changes in the group value system encompassing
social, cultural, and religious values will only come about from new insights and
revelations that come from the development of many personal value systems.
The group values evolve, change, and improve once personal values have
identified new areas where the group values have to improve to benefit all or the
vast majority of the collective individuals that make up the group, society,
culture, or religion.
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This development of the group value system has in particular accelerated
in recent human history, because the vital needs of water and food are met for
many people. Newborns come into environmental contexts where the bare
necessities for survival are readily available to them. With this part of the value
system equation already met, the new baby can almost immediately begin to
develop a moral value system recognizing the importance of other individuals. It
is at this stage where the value of life is realized. The “value of life” is a widely
held societal truth. The importance of life is an absolute truth. A person can only
live a healthy and prosperous life if they personally accept that all life which
includes their own life and that of everyone else is important. Once this absolute
truth of the importance of the right to life is established, then a full value system
can be possible.
This necessity for respecting and allowing all life to flourish is only
possible once both the personal and group value systems accept this as a
founding fundamental or absolute truth to be followed by all. The absolute truth
of the unconditional importance of life is conducive to the search of individual
happiness and group prosperity. Of course, this is the starting point or seed that
then allows for the correction, evolution, and enhancement of the wider value
systems enacted by many societies, cultures, and religions.
In inference, there cannot be a disconnect in the cyclical connection
between personal and group values. If there is a disconnect where one value
system triumphs over the other then the value systems become too skewed in
one direction. If personal values are suppressing other personal values then
group values would not be able to come about. In the same respect if group
values suppress individual values, then the group values will not progress the
overall group.
The points discussed in this paper are effectively the battles that seem to
be raging at this very point in time in human history. The well-being of the
individual versus the well-being of the collective. In Western civilization, taking
as an example the United States of America, there is a great respect given to the
rights of the individual and his or her personal values system. As would be
expected, this sometimes conflicts with the importance of the greater collective
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or group value system. As discussed earlier, the importance of the ‘common
good’ is what determines the fairness of the individual’s needs versus the needs
of all others. However, in Western civilization the personal values systems are
protected and respected. In certain Eastern civilizations, for example China, the
importance of the group value system outweighs the individual citizen’s
personal value system. The needs of the collective are more important than the
needs of the individual.
In conclusion, whether personal values are placed before group values or
group values are placed before personal values, the first realization that must be
made is that all life is valuable. The absolute truth of all values systems is that the
preservation of life is of fundamental importance to the overall survival and
flourishing of all current and future human civilizations. The actions of how life
is preserved or protected remain the main dilemma that needs further
development. Realizing that personal values and group values are symbiotic and
cyclically connected will help determine how best to adapt a universal value
system that honors and progresses both the individual and social contentment
and stability.
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Infusing Values and Ethics in the Classroom

RAFFI MANJIKIAN

When teaching in an academic institution, in addition to training students
in a specific discipline, instructors should also be able to teach students about
values and ethics. This is due to the fact that professors are viewed as role
models to the students and therefore must be able to inspire students to want to
learn and be good people. In essence, the professor must be a role model in the
development of a moral person. Once the student attains this desire to become a
moral person, they must practice what they have learned about values and ethics
in everyday life.
According to Cronin, Lonergan recognizes that there are five basic kinds
of values and ethics that people should possess. The values and ethics he refers
to are vital, social, cultural, moral, and religious. Everything begins with a desire
to acquire knowledge and being attentive. This is then driven forward through
feelings and experiences. It is these feelings and experiences that make a person
gain insight into who they are, and what kind of values and ethics they possess.
With this newly acquired intelligence, a level of understanding takes place as to
why a person behaves the way that they do. Next, a person attains cultural
values by a level of judgment and reasoning as to how other people act around
them. Then, a person obtains moral values by being responsible and not
forgetting how to act appropriately, even if others around them are not
displaying the same type of ethical and moral behavior. Finally, religious values
are obtained through love and being true to oneself.1
In order for a person to attain these five values, a person must go through
life experiences that demonstrate what is good and bad. This is determined by
evaluation, decision making, and action. By doing this, a person is able to
determine a good and bad way of doing things, in addition to things that they
should and should not do. This acquisition of knowledge will help a person
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develop moral character and will hopefully inspire the person to lead by
example in helping others achieve values and ethics.
In an academic setting, values and ethics must be instilled in people.
Without this general knowledge of what is right and wrong, people will not be
able to strive to better themselves, and they will lack the necessary requirements
to develop into good and moral individuals. With these values and ethics, people
should not forget that in order to be a good person, one must treat others the
way that they would want to be treated. In addition to being polite and
respectful, people should also remember that not everyone is the same, and that
people should do what they can to help one another aspire to become the
greatest person that they can be.

Works Cited
Cronin, Brian. Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective. Nairobi: Consolata Institute of
Philosophy Press, 2006.

1

Brian Cronin, Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective (Nairobi: Consolata Institute of Philosophy

Press, 2006).

25

Method in Managerial Accounting

ATHAR MURTUZA

Buoyed by attending a conference of Jesuit business educators and
bolstered by attending the Faculty Summer Seminar, “Understanding Values”
this past summer, I told my colleagues in the Accounting Department that we
ought to infuse in the course Managerial Accounting, which is a required course
for all undergraduate business majors, a recently issued document by the
Vatican’s Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, “The Vocation of the Business
Leader.”

For those who may not know, managerial accounting provides

information to the decision makers within the organization in the hope that they
will make informed decisions. It is different than its sibling financial accounting
in that it is internal information and not bound by regulatory mandates. In
response to my suggestion, two of my colleagues in the department asked me the
simple question: What has the Vatican document to do with managerial
accounting? Despite its source, the document does not preach Catholic or even
Christian theology; its concerns are with living on planet earth!
My response to the question asked could be limited to one word: Mission!
The accrediting body for business education, the Association to Advance
Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), has lately let it be known that collegiate
institutions are to be held accountable for what they claim to be their mission.
Translated, it means that if one claims to be the “middle earth,” than it ought to
show off Hobbits! It also means that a college claiming to abide by the Catholic
mission ought to do more than have itsy-bitsy statues in most if not all of its
classrooms as well as provide an ample supply of ash for the foreheads of the
believers one day a year. Given its assertion to be a Catholic institution, Stillman
School would do well to infuse a document such as the “The Vocation of the
Business Leader” into a required course such as Managerial Accounting. This
would be the rationale for my one word response. But the one word reply seems
all too egregious. It would be far better to point to other reasons that would show
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that such an infusion need not stick out like a disjointed thumb. Furthermore,
there is, indeed, a method to managerial accounting, and it is not like the all too
viral perception that accountants just crunch out numbers using mechanical,
dogmatic, black and white rules that result in black and white accounting
reports.
The text used for the required managerial accounting course at the
Stillman School would be a good starting place to justify the infusion of the
Vatican document to be less than egregious. In its first chapter, the text devotes
all of two pages to talk about globalization; and one of those two pages is
devoted to graphical representations of imports and exports to the United States.
The impact of the coverage of globalization seems to be on showing who major
trading partners of the United States are, but there is much more to globalization
than knowing who the major importer and exporters happen to be. The same
chapter takes up the importance of ethics in business by devoting a little over
five pages, but this coverage seems to be on corporate codes of conduct,
including two pages devoted to the code suggested for the management
accountants by the Institute of Management Accounting, and a quarter of a page
to corporate governance. Lastly, it has about a page and a half devoted to the
topic of corporate social responsibility. In 600 plus pages, it seems scanty to say
so little about values, when the word “value-centric” happens to be in the
mission statement of the Stillman School.
It seems what the “Vocation” does is to add more to what the text used for
the course seeks to do scantily. Such an addition could hardly be egregious. It is
pointing out the side-effects, not all of them beneficial, of globalization and
showing the impact changing environments and technology can have on human
lives and society. It is not just the managerial accounting text that deals with
topics covered in the Vatican document; in fact, all core courses taught in the
Stillman School for management, marketing, finance, do cover the same topics
and do not do so in any greater depth than does the managerial accounting text.
Clearly something that provides additional depth to topics mentioned and dealt
with rather summarily should be a welcome infusion.
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But there is a reason, even more pertinent for using “The Vocation of the
Business Leader” document in business courses to enhance them. There is an
illustration in the second chapter of the text that depicts the planning and control
cycle. It shows the work of managers through the lens of planning and control
cycle. The cycle, the text notes, depicts what the organization seeks to do; it starts
with planning, goes through implementing through direction and motivation;
then resorts to measuring, and comparing the results with the plans that started
the cycle. At the center of the diagram is decision making. The phrase is not
elaborated or explained in the exhibit itself. The illustration gives the impression
that decision making is automatic, instantaneous! The text does note that the
managerial accounting is concerned with providing information to managers;
however the illustration does not do so, it leaves one without any appreciation of
what is involved in making informed, let alone good, decisions.
The planning and control cycle is based on the much better known plando-check-act (PDCA) cycle. That could be actually seen as the method suggested
to the planners and decision-makers. But the method also comes across as failing
to emphasize the importance of reflection, thinking, and experience as well as the
role of information in the planning and control. It also does not have any links
with good or bad, let alone the common good or social justice. It personifies what
T. S. Eliot said:
All our knowledge brings us nearer to death,
But nearness to death no nearer to God.
Where is the Life we have lost in living?
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?
This absence is very significant, because it reinforces the problem of
divided lives, which the Vatican document is seeking to deal with: “obstacles to
serving the common good come in many forms —lack of rule of law, corruption,
tendencies towards greed, poor stewardship of resources—but the most
signiﬁcant for a business leader on a personal level is leading a “divided” life.
This split between faith and daily business practice can lead to imbalances and
misplaced devotion to worldly success. The alternative path of faith-based
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“servant leadership” provides business leaders with a larger perspective and
helps to balance the demands of the business world with those of ethical social
principles, illumined for Christians by the Gospel”. 1
By using the document, one could infuse the method of managerial
accounting with goodness. That is reason enough to use what is available! The
method of managerial accounting (or for that matter all business disciplines as
presented in their texts) do not take into account the higher levels of something
secular such as Bloom’s Taxonomy, let alone the ideas of someone such as
Bernard Lonergan. In failing to do so, such texts limit the intellectual
development of students. The infusion of “The Vocation of the Business Leader”
would enrich the education being provided by business colleges.
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Practical Theology, Reflexivity,
and the Voyage of Self-Discovery

TODD J. STOCKDALE

In the second chapter of Fr. Brian Cronin’s text, he puts forward the
notion that consciousness and self-appropriation can serve as viable methods in
value ethics. In doing so, he invites readers on “a voyage of self-discovery,” to
uncover “the moral imperative, the moral activities, the moral feelings, already
operating within [a person].”1 This notion, which was drawn from the
transcendental imperative of Bernard Lonergan’s theory of knowledge—namely,
to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and in love—generated a high
degree of rich discussion in the second Faculty Summer Seminar at Seton Hall in
August 2013.

Significantly, this “voyage of self-discovery” is a critical

component in the process of reflexivity, a process by which the practical
theologian becomes attentive to “the self” in the generation of theological data in
qualitative research.
In their work on practical theology and qualitative research, John Swinton
and Harriet Mowat suggest that reflexivity “is perhaps the most crucial
dimension of the qualitative research process”, impacting every dimension of
qualitative research.2 Defined by Linda Finlay as “the project of examining how
the researcher and intersubjective elements impact on and transform research”,
reflexivity is the critical gaze that practical theologians turn towards themselves
in the qualitative research process.3 While this turn towards examining how the
researcher impacts and transforms the research calls into question the original
claims of the social sciences, which suggested that the researcher was to be
neutral, cut off, and objective, it also opens the way for the type of self-reflection
called for by Cronin in his proposed methods in value ethics. Indeed, practical
theologians who reflexively engage in the pursuit of qualitative data, find
themselves tracing the various levels of consciousness set forth by Lonergan and
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adopted by Cronin. Most notably, they begin with the level of experience, where
deep attention is given to data at hand.
Yet, the generation of data through this type of research imposes some
unique requirements on the practical theologian. Social geographer Liz Bondi
suggests that generating data through qualitative methods such as interviews
and participant observation, which draw upon interpersonal interactions,
requires, “researchers to use themselves in unique ways since the people with
whom they interact are also sentient, feeling human beings”.4

Thus, according

to Bondi, the data generated through qualitative methods are “not so much
collected as produced or constructed or co-constructed”, because “both parties
are actively involved in the creation of data in the course of their various
interpersonal encounters”.5 Of significance for this summer seminar’s discussion,
the involvement of both parties in the data generation activity requires practical
theologians to reflexively situate themselves within this process—again, opening
the way for the ever-important journey of self-discovery argued for by Cronin in
his text on value ethics.
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